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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ANGELENA A. W .ALKER, De-
ceased, Walker Bank &· Trust 
Company, a corporation, executor 
of the last will of said deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
1 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION J 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 6299 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 11, 1935, Angelena A. Walker as trustor, 
entered into an irrevocable trust agreement with Walker 
Bank & Trust Company as trustee (Abs. 5, Trans. 5) where-
in and whereby the trustor transferred to the trustee cer-
tain shares of capital stock, to be held in trust, the income 
therefrom to be paid to the trustor during her life, and 
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upon her death to her children, with the corpus to the 
grandchildren, as in such instrument provided. 
Angelena A. Walker died testate on the ~th day of 
June, 1939, and thereafter Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
named in the will of said deceased as such, was appointed 
and qualified as executor of her estate. Thereafter, and on 
the 23rd day of December, 1939, said executor filed in the 
court below an Inheritance Tax Report and Appraisement, 
listing property in the estate of said deceased (Abs. 2, 
Trans. 1) but did not include therein the property trans-
ferred by such trust agreement, although at that time it 
advised the Tax Commission of Utah of such trust agree-
ment, and supplied it with a copy thereof, contending that 
the subject matter of said trust is not subject to inheritance 
tax to the State of Utah (Abs. 4, Trans. 2). Thereafter, 
and on April 18, 1940, the State Tax Commission of Utah 
filed in the probate proceedings in the court below its peti-
tion for an order adjudging the transfer of property under 
such trust indenture to be a taxable transfer under the 
inheritance tax laws of the State of Utah, and that such 
executor be required to file a supplemental inventory cover-
ing such trust property and have such trust property ap-
praised for inheritance tax purposes (Abs. 5, Trans. 5). 
The executor demurred to this petition (Abs. 11, Trans. 
9), which demurrer was overruled on July 9, 1940 (Abs. 12, 
Trans. 12). The executor elected to stand upon its demurrer 
(Abs. 12, Trans. 15) and thereupon the c-ourt below made 
and entered its judgment dated July 17, 1940, to the effect 
that such transfer under said trust indenture is a taxable 
transfer under the provisions of the inheritance tax laws 
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of the State of Utah, and ordering· said executor to file a 
supplemental inventory of the property so transferred by 
said trust indenture, for appraisement for state inheritance 
tax purposes. 
This appeal is taken from such order. 
ERRORS RELIED UPON 
Appellant has assigned as error the overruling by 
the court below of its demurrer and the making and ren-
dering of its said judgment dated July 17, 1940, and relies 
upon such errors for reversal of said judgment of the 
court below. 
STATEMENT OF QUESTION INVOLVED FOR 
DETERMINATION 
The only question involved in this appeal is one of law 
as to whether the property transferred by the deceased, 
Angelena A. Walker, by such irrevocable trust indenture, 
is subject to inheritance tax to the State of Utah as a 
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment 
at or after the death of the trustor. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 80-12-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah, 1935·, provides for 
a tax equal to certain specified percentages of the market 
value of the net estate upon the "transfer of the net estate 
of every decedent." 
Section 80-12-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is as 
follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"The value of the gross estate of a decedent 
shall be determined by including the value at the 
time of his death of all property, real or personal, 
within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest 
therein, whether tangible or intangible, which shall 
pass to any person, in trust or otherwise, by testa-
mentary disposition ·or by law of inheritance or 
succession of this or any other state or country, or 
by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made in con-
templation of the death of the grantor, vendor or 
donor, ·or intended to take effect in possession or 
enjoyment at or after his death." 
Respondent contends that the transfer under the 
trust here involved was one "intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after " the death of Mrs. 
Walker, and is therefore subject to inheritance tax to the 
State of Utah. Appellant eontends that it was not a transfer 
to take effect either in possession or enjoyment at or after 
her death. 
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 237, 
74 L. ed. 826 (1930), the highest courts of the states where 
the question had arisen had decided that transfers by ir-
revocable trust, where the donor had reserved the income 
therefrom during his life, were transfers made to take 
effect in p~ssession or enjoyment at or after the death of the 
donor, and subject to tax under the inheritance tax laws 
of such states, without in any case going into the distinction 
betw·een inher.itance tax laws and estate-tax laws. 
On April 14, 1930, the Supreme Court of the United 
Stat~s handed down its.decisioni~ the case of May v. Heiner, 
which involved the construction of the language with· respect 
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to a transfer by irrevocable trust, the donor retaining in-
come during life, under the provisions of the F'ederal estate 
tax law, as then in effect, making subject to such tax trans-
fers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after" death. It appears from the decision that Pauline 
May in 1917 transferred certain personal property in trust, 
to collect the income therefrom and after discharging 
taxes, expenses, etc., to pay the balance "to Barney May 
during his lifetime, and after his decease, to Pauline May 
during her lifetime, and after her decease, all the property 
in said trust, in whatever form or shape it may be, shall, 
after the expenses of the trust have been deducted or paid, 
be distributed equally among" her four children, their 
distributees or appointees. 
The court, in holding that the transfer was not taxable, 
even though the donor retained income during her life after 
the death of her husband, uses the following language: 
" . At the death of Mrs. May no interest 
in the property held under the trust deed passed 
from her to the living; title thereto had been defin-
itely fixed by the trust deed. The interest therein 
which she possessed immediately prior to her death 
was obliterated by that event. 
"Section 401 Revenue Act of 1918, lays a charge 
'upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent 
dying after the passage of this act,' and Sec. 402 
directs that 'the value of the gross estate of the 
decedent shall be determined by including the value 
at the time of his death of all property, real or 
personal, tangible or intangible, whenever situated 
(c) to the extent of any interest therein 
of which the decedent has at any time made a trans-
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fer, or with respect to which he has at any tijne 
created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to 
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after 
his death . ' 
"The statute imposes 'an excise upon the trans-
fer of an estate upon death of the owner.' . 
"In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 278 U. S. 
339, 347, 348, 73 L. ed. 410, 414, 415, 66 A. L. R. 397, 
49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12.3, the estate tax prescribed by 
the Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 402 (c) and carried 
into the Act of 1921 (November 23) 42· Stat. at 
L. 278, chap. 136, as Sec. 402 (c) thereof was under 
consideration. This court said: 
"'In its plan and scope the tax is one im-
posed on transfers at death or made in contem-
plation of death and is measured by the value 
at death of the interest which is transferred 
One may freely give his property to 
another by absolute gift without subjecting him-
self or his estate to a tax, but we are asked to 
say that this statute means that he may not 
make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute and 
complete, without subjecting it to a tax if the 
gift takes the form of a life estate in one with 
remainder over to another at or after the donor's 
death. It would require plain and eompelling 
language to justify so incongruous a result and 
we think it is wanting. in the present statute 
" 'In the light of the ·general· purpose of the 
statute and the language of Sec. 401 explicitly 
imposing the tax on net estates of decedents, we 
think it at least doubtful whether the trusts or 
interests in a trust intended to be reached by 
the phrase in Sec. 402· (c) , 'to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after his death,' in-
.. clude any others than those passing from the 
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7 
possession, enjoyment or control of the donor 
at his death and so taxable as transfers at death 
under Sec. 401. That doubt must be resolved 
in favor of the taxpayer.'" 
It may be contended by respondent that this case is 
not controlling because of the slight difference in the terms 
of the trust, and because it quotes as support for the decision, 
the earlier decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Reineke v. Northern Trust Company, 
278 U. S. 339, which it may be contended does not pass upon 
the question involved here. Even though all that were true, 
the Supreme Court of the United States, subsequently, left 
no doubt as to its holding that gifts or transfers under 
irrevocable trusts, where the income was reserved to the 
donor, were not subject to Federal estate tax as "intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after" death, 
all as clearly indicated by Per Curiam decisions on Writs 
of Certiorari in the three United States Circuit Court of 
Appeal cases to which we next invite the. attention of this 
Court. 
Commissioner v. Northern Trust Company, 41 
Fed. ( 2d) 732 
The transfer involved in this case was by irrevocable 
trust -deed providing for payment of income to settlor for 
life and thereafter to children. The court, in deciding that 
the transfer was not taxable as intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after death, uses the follow-
ing language : 
"Did Mrs. ·Van Schaick, when she executed the 
trust deed~ intend that· the ·transfer should !take 
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· effect in possession or enjoyment at or after her 
death? Petitioner contends that this question should 
be answered in the affirmative, relying on numer-
ous decisions applying similar statutes to situations 
like the one here presented. Reish, Adm'r, v. Com-
monwealth, 106 Pa. 521; In re Johnson's Estate 
(Surr.) 19 N. Y. S. 963, 965; People v. Carpenter, 
264 Ill. 400, 106 N. E. 302. Since the briefs were 
written, in this case, the Supreme Court decided 
the case of May v. Heiner, 50S. Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826. 
We are unable to distinguish the material facts in 
that case from those in the instant case. It is true 
that the settlor in the May Case provided in her trust 
deed for the life use by her husband and, upon his 
death, she surviving, for the life use of herself. This 
difference in the facts, however, seems to us im-
material. The conclusion, under this decision, seems 
inescapable that property conveyed by an irrevocable 
deed of trust, to third parties, with no reversionary 
interest, contingent or otherwise, in the settlor, 
though the income during the settlor's life be payable 
to settlor, does not pass at the settlor's death, but 
at the date of the execution and delivery of the 
deed of trust. " 
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the 
Unit~d States, 283 U. S. 782, that Court by Per Curiam 
decision, affirmed the decision of the lower court "upon 
the authority of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 74 L. ed. 826, 
67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286." 
Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 Fed. (2d) 277 
In this case, the· Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
transfer under a trust agreement calling for payment of 
estate to settlor if she survived beneficiaries was taxable 
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as a "transfer intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment after death." 
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 283 U. S. 783, that Court by Per Curiam 
decision, reversed the decision of the lower court "upon 
the authority of May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 72 L. ed. 
826, 67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286." 
Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 Fed. (2d) 902 
In this case the court held that the property transferred 
by an irrevocable trust was subject to Federal estate tax 
as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after death, in the court's language, "where in creating 
the trust, the donor reserves during life the enjoyment of 
the income of the trust, that to cease or to pass to another 
only on the donor's death." 
On Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 283 U. S. 783, that Court by Per Curiam 
decision, reversed the decision of the lower court "upon 
th.e authority of May v. Heiner, 2:81 U. S. 238, 72 L. ed. 826, 
67 A. L. R. 1244, 50 S. Ct. 286." 
We will later discuss the case of Rising's Estate v. 
State (Minn.) 242 N. W. 459, but it is significant that in 
that case, where it was held that a transfer under an 
irrevocable trust where the donor retained . the income 
for life was taxable under the inheritance tax statute of 
Minnesota, after discussing May v. Heiner and the three 
Federal cases above noted, with the action of the Supreme 
Court thereon, the court states: "Of course, such decisions 
end debate as to the construction of the act of Congress 
which. they interpret.'' 
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Clearly the rule in the Federal courts is that a gift or 
transfer under irrevocable trust where the donor retains 
the income for life is not subject to the Federal estate 
tax in effect prior to amendment, as intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after death. 
The Federal estate tax was amended in 1932 to add 
to the language "intended to take effect in possession or 
enjoyment at or after his death" the language "or of which 
he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, 
under which he has retained for his life . . the right 
to the income from the property . .",Section 811, Title 
26, U. S. C. A. 
The question for decision involved here is a matter 
of first impression in this court. We do not contend that 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
are binding upon this court in a matter of construction of 
our state inheritance tax laws, as no Federal constitutional 
questions are involved, and it is merely a matter of statu-
tory construction in which tpis court has the final say as 
to these particular state statutes. We do contend, however, 
that these Federal decisions, and especially those of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, are highly persuasive, 
and in view of the nature of our inheritance tax statutes 
as defined by this court, and the decisions in the highest 
courts of ·other states since the rendition of the decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the United States to which we have 
called attention, differentiating between their statutes as 
inheritance tax. laws and that of the Federal government 
as estate tax laws, we think that the rule laid. do.wn by the 
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Supreme Court of the United States is the one that reason 
should compel this court to adopt. 
In the state cases decided before the case of May v. 
Heiner, holding that a transfer similar to the transfer here 
involved, was a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death, no issue was raised as to the distinc-
tion between the effect of an inheritance tax and estate tax 
upon the interpretation of this language. 
The state cases since May v. Heiner have in most cases 
differentiated between the interpretation of "possession 
or enjoyment at or after death" under inheritance and under 
estate tax laws, and in all such cases where the issue was 
raised, the statute involved was an inheritance tax statute. 
It must be borne in mind that in May v. Heiner the 
last quoted .language was interpreted under an estate tax 
statute and in this connection, it is very important to note 
that ·our so-called "Inheritance" tax statute involves not an 
inheritance tax, but an estate tax. This is unique and un-
usual with respect to state statutes as they are nearly all 
inheritance tax statutes and determined to be such. This 
court, however, has determined our "Inheritance" tax to be 
an estate tax. 
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 
424, 55 Pac. (2d) 171 
This court in this case, in holding the Utah statute to 
be an estate tax, uses the following language: 
"The tax in reality is not a levy on the abstract 
right to either transmit or to receive, but is on the 
exercise of one or the other right ·or on the trans-
action by which the property is transmitted and 
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received. It is the death of the decedent, with the 
resulting transfer of the estate by will or operation 
of law, which gives rise to the tax." 
"For purposes .of precise classification, the term 
'inheritance tax' is used to indicate a tax imposed on 
the right to receive, and the term 'estate tax' desig-
nates a tax imposed on the right to transmit. Our 
statute uses the term 'inheritance tax,' but that fact 
should not be conclusive in fixing its classification 
because used in its general sense rather than with 
scientific nicety. We must look to the enactment 
itself rather than to its title in order to determine 
the nature and incidence of the tax." 
It will be noted that Section 80-12-2, Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1933, as so amended, imposes a tax upon the 
transfer just as in the Federal estate tax. 
Under most of the state statutes, it is the receipt by 
the heir, legatee or beneficiary that is taxed, whereas under 
our statute and the Federal estate tax statute, it is the 
transmission by the deceased which is taxed, hence the 
holding in May v. Heiner that the transfer and delivery of 
the property at the time ·of the trust deed is the controlling 
act as distinguished from the receipt of the income by others 
than the donor after his death. Now let us see what the 
highest courts of other states have had to say about this 
distinction since the decision in May v. Heiner. 
Russell v. Cogswell (Kans.) 98 P. (2d) 179 
This case was decided in March of this year, and is 
the last case we are able to find involving the question here 
discussed. In that case, it was held, in the language of the 
syllabus, that "an irrevocable trust agreement by which 
trustor fully parted with legal title to property, reserving 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
to herself only income therefrom during her lifetime 
constituted a 'deed, or g·rant or gift intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor' 
within the Kansas Inheritance Tax Law." The court, in its 
opinion, however, finds no irreconcilable conflict between 
its decision and that of the Federal courts. In this respect, 
we quote from the opinion as follows : 
"Let us consider whether there is in fact an 
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and the 
state decisions on this question. It must be remem-
bered, at the outset, that the federal cases cited deal 
with the federal 'estate tax' while the state cases 
deal with 'inheritance taxes' similar to the Kansas 
statute. Though some courts have loosely used the 
two terms interchangeably, the fundamental differ-
ence between the two has been pointed out by the 
textbook writers and many times in well-considered 
judicial opinions. While the term 'inheritance tax' 
has sometimes been used in a general sense to cover 
all 'death taxes' a more restricted meaning is now 
generally accepted. An 'estate tax' such as the 
federal law imposes is a tax upon the right to trans-
mit or transfer property at death. It is levied upon 
the body Qf the estate before distribution. It does 
not at all involve, primarily, the right of the distFib-
utee to receive the property. An 'inheritance ta?C' on 
the other hand is not a tax upon the right to trans-
mit or transfer, but is a succession tax, a tax upon 
the right. of the distributee to receive the property 
. The two rights are distinct and separate. 
Neither is a. natural right, but is a right conferred 
upon the individual by the state as an act of grace. 
The power which so confers the right may levy a 
tax upon its exercise." · · 
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The court then goes on to discuss the May v. Heiner 
decision to show the difference in the nature of the taxes, 
and we particularly call the court's attention to this reason-
ing. The court then says : 
"But does this reasoning apply equally to an 
inheritance tax? We think not. If the gift was com-
plete as far as the grantor was concerned when 
the trust was created, it may well be argued that 
an estate tax, being a tax upon the transfer from 
the grantor, may not be imposed at his death since no 
such transfer takes place at that time. But in the 
case of an inheritance tax the completeness of such 
previous transfer does not alter the fact that the 
right to receive does not accrue to the beneficiary 
until the death of the grantor." 
Blodget v. Guaranty Trust Co. (Conn.) 158 
Atl. 245 
In this case it was held that transfers to a trustee under 
an irrecovable trust to pay the income to transferors during 
life and upon death to designated beneficiaries, were sub-
ject to state inheritance tax as "intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at transferor's death." The tax 
here involved was an inheritance or succession tax. The 
court, in its opinion, differentiated the tw·o. After discuss-
ing May v. Heiner and the Reineke case, the court says : 
" It is obvious from the quotation from 
the opinion in the Reineke Case, which we have 
given above, that the decision, upon which the suc-
ceeding cases -relied, was motivated by the nature 
of the federal estate tax, which is upon the transfer 
of, rather than the succession to, property of the 
decedent. On the other hand, with a few 
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exceptions, the state inheritance tax statutes levy 
a duty or excise upon the beneficiary for the privi-
lege or right of succession to property The 
federal cases above mentioned, which are relied upon 
in support of the claim that the transfers here in 
question are not taxable, since they 'deal with the 
construction of federal statutes imposing estate taxes 
and . . . are distinguishable because of the terms 
of those statutes, if not on other grounds.' 
We have been able to discover no relevant subse-
quent case which has given these decisions an effect 
adverse to the taxability of such gifts under state 
succession tax statutes." (Italics ours). 
We again call the attention of the court to the fact 
that our state "Inheritance" tax statute is one of the few 
which is not a tax upon the succession to property. 
In re Rising's Estate v. State (Minn.) 242 
N. W. 459 
In this case a gift such as is involved in the case at bar 
was held subject to state inheritance tax of Minnesota, the 
language of which, however, was much broader than our 
statute with respect to possession or enjoyment at or after 
death, and covered "any property or the income thereof" 
when the donee becomes "beneficially entitled, in posses-
sion or expectancy." After referring to the Federal cases 
herein cited by us, the court uses this language : 
" Of course, such decisions end debate 
as to the construction of the act of Congress which 
they interpret. But, however persuasive, they are 
not binding upon us in the construction of our own 
statute, as to which it is our privilege to err, if that 
be the result of our deliberate judgment. That aside, 
our state tax is so far different, in incidence, from 
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the federal excise that the cases are easily distin-
guishable. 'In its plan and scope' the latter is 'on 
transfers at death or made in contemplation of death.' 
'It is not a gift tax.' Our law, on the contrary, does 
tax gifts. The federal 'exaction is not a succession 
tax. The right to become beneficially en .. 
titled is not the occasion for it.' Nichols v. Coolidge, 
274 U. S. 531, 541, 47 S. Ct. 710, 713, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 
52 A. L. R. 1081. Our law imposes, not alone a 
transfer tax, but a succession tax also. State v. 
Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 232 N. W. 331. 'The thing 
burdened is the right to receive.' Leach v. Nichols, 
52 S. Ct. 338, 340, 76 L. Ed.- (opinion filed March 
14, 1932). With reference to the federal tax, a trans-
fer and not a succession tax was the language used in 
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. and repeated in 
May v. Heiner, to the effect that one may freely give 
away his property without subjecting his estate to a 
tax, and that otherwise the result would be 'incon-
gruous.' 
"Incongruous or not, our state tax is expressly 
put on successions of the kind now involved. " 
In re Kutche's Estate (Mich.) 256 N. W. 586 
The decision in this case, in the language of the syl-
labus, was that "irrevocable trust with direction to trustee 
to pay entire income to trustor for life and upon her death 
to deliver principal to certain beneficiaries, some of whose 
shares, were trusted, held subject to inheritance tax as a 
'gift intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after death' of trustor." The court distinguishes the 
tax under the state law of l\iichigan from the Federal tax 
on the basis of inheritance and estate taxes as discussed in 
the case of In re Rising's Estate, supra, and in this respect 
adopts the language of said case. 
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We find no case where the issue has been raised that 
hold a transfer such as is involved here is subject to tax 
under an Esta.te tax statute, as distinguished from an In-
heritance or Succession tax statute. 
We therefore respectfully submit that in view of the 
persuasive nature of the Federal decisions, the decision of 
this Court that our "Inheritance" tax is really an estate 
tax as distinguished from other states where their inheri-
tance tax statutes are in reality inheritance or succession 
tax statutes, and the differentiation of these two classes 
of statues as set forth in the recent state cases, it should 
be held that the property transferred by the irrevocable 
trust here involved is not subject to tax under the "Inheri-
tance" tax laws of the State of Utah, and that the judgment 
of the lower court herein complained of be reversed and 
set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
INGE'BRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS 
& CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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